In The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach, Michael Licona examines several hypotheses that attempt to explain the rise of early Christian belief in Jesus’ resurrection. Each of these is evaluated on the basis of five criteria: 1) explanatory scope; 2) explanatory power; 3) plausibility; 4) level of “ad hoc-ness”; and 5) illumination. How well does any hypothesis account for the three known historical facts: Jesus’ death by crucifixion, his disciples’ belief shortly after his death that he had been raised from the dead, and Paul’s belief that he had seen the risen Jesus. I offer here a very brief summary of each of Licona’s five criteria for judging historical hypotheses:
- Explanatory Scope – How much of the historical bedrock is accounted for by the hypothesis?
- Explanatory Power – What is the quality of the explanation of the facts? “The hypothesis that explains the data with the least amount of effort, vagueness, and ambiguity has greater explanatory power” (109).
- Plausibility – “This criterion assesses whether other areas known with confidence suggest a certain hypothesis” (110).
- Less ad hoc – A hypothesis is more ad hoc when it “enlists nonevidenced assumptions, that is, when it goes beyond what is already known” (110). All other things being equal, the hypothesis that is least ad hoc is to be preferred.
- Illumination – A hypothesis might provide “a possible solution to other problems [not central to the main question being explored] without confusing other areas held with confidence” (111). This criterion is the least important for Licona and is “unnecessary for confirming the overall probability of a hypothesis” (114).
In essence, then, Licona is suggesting that historical work be done by making an “argument to the best explanation” of the known facts.
The first hypothesis to be examined is that of Geza Vermes, whose view can be summarized as follows:
- The empty tomb is historical. Jesus’ tomb really was empty at a point shortly after his death and burial.
- The appearances (apparitions?) to Jesus’ original disciples are also historical.
- Belief in the bodily resurrection of Jesus is not supported by evidence that meets the standards of legal or scientific inquiry.
- The following naturalistic explanations all fail upon further examination: Jesus’ body was stolen, the wrong tomb was visited, Jesus did not actually die, or Jesus resurrection was spiritual.
- Historians are unable to determine whether Jesus was actually resurrected. Agnosticism on the matter is the proper position to take.
- After Jesus’ crucifixion, his followers had a powerful mystical experience at Pentecost that convinced them he had been raised and motivated them to continue their ministry (472-73).
Licona judges Vermes’ hypothesis (VH) as follows:
1. Explanatory scope. VH fares well in explaining Jesus’ death and the post-resurrection appearances to Jesus’ original disciples. However, it does not explain Paul’s experience. It thus lacks full explanatory scope.
2. Explanatory power. Because VH is imprecise in describing the nature of the appearances, the hypothesis lacks in this area. Were they hallucinations, actual communications from heaven by Jesus, or what? Furthermore, what was the cause of Paul’s experience and why did it convince him that Jesus had been raised bodily? And while Vermes believes Jesus’ tomb was empty, he offers no explanation for this while rejecting all of the traditional ones (i.e., Jesus rose, body stolen or moved, wrong tomb visited). These and other issues show VH deficient in explanatory power.
3. Plausibility. Because VH does not assess the nature of the appearances, it is difficult to judge him in this area. Licona, however, does not “wish to penalize Vermes for refusing to speculate beyond what he believes is allowed by the evidence” (478), so Licona will wait to see if other hypotheses fare better in this area.
4. Less ad hoc. VH seems to do well in this area, as there are few, if any, appeals to nonevidenced facts or claims. However, according to Licona, “its a priori exclusion of [the resurrection hypothesis] without argument may be an ad hoc component” (478).
5. Illumination. VH does not provide illumination for other areas, largely due to the fact that it “possesses a great deal of ambiguity and vagueness” (478).
Licona concludes by stating that “VH lacks explanatory scope, explanatory power, is only somewhat plausible and may contain an ad hoc component. It provides no illumination for unanswered questions” (479).
I concur with most of Licona’s assessment of VH. Vermes’ complete lack of explanation for the empty tomb significantly weakens his case, IMO. Once that detail is judged historical (a step Licona himself doesn’t include in his own argument), and the appearances are judged historical, there needs to be SOME hypothesis about what happened to the body. To punt on the matter will not cause many to be persuaded by one’s case.
Is an unsupportable hypothesis for the empty tomb better than an admission that we can not know? The willingness to accept ambiguity when necessary is a strength not a weakness.
Scott – In order to answer your question fairly, I would need to know the basis on which it was concluded that the tomb was indeed empty. Once I had that information I would be able to address your question responsibly.
I assume that the staying power of a report by women in 1c Palestine convinces Vermes that this detail is genuine. He may also need a seed to generate the cognitive dissonance that can drive interpretations of subsequent experiences.
That said, you are right. While I stand by my respect for agnosticism in historical investigation, we do not know why Dr Vermes holds to the historicity of the empty tomb but considers other details unknowable.
The continuity, coherence, and graphic realism of the person, message, and deeds of Jesus — prior to the crucifixion — must be a dominant factor in explaining (1) the empty tomb, (2) the appearances of Jesus, and (3) the intense teaching and missions activity of the earliest Christians.
In trying to deal with the Gospels at a micro level (forms, redactions, literary sources, etc. — that are highly speculative), critics have lost sight of their macroscopic unity. The words, deeds, and personality of Jesus come through clearly in the Gospels in a general way; and they all cohere and fit the historical and cultural context in which they happened.
With that portrait of Jesus — including his predictions and intentionally orchestrated actions leading to and including what happened during Passion Week — his resurrection makes loads of sense and demands only one explanation.
Incidentally, as to Vermes’ analysis, the events of Pentecost do not come as an aspect of resurrection-material. The apostles had already been convinced. Pentecost looks forward, not backward.
You certainly write Licona more clearly than he does himself.
Thanks, Diana. Maybe I can ghostwrite his next book.
If the empty tomb is not part of the “historical bedrock,” why does it form a basis for dismissing Vermes theory?
Vinny – I would say it’s because it makes his hypothesis weaker than if he had concluded otherwise on the tomb. Vermes included it in his historical bedrock, Licona didn’t, so Vermes bears the burden of proof for a) demonstrating his claim, and b) positing an explanation for it. But he fails on the latter account by not even trying.
So, here is his hypothesis:
1. Jesus died and was buried.
2. His tomb was discovered empty shortly afterward, but we know that this was not due to a) theft, or b) visiting the wrong tomb.
3. People claimed to see Jesus alive shortly after his death.
So Vermes knows enough to say that the body wasn’t stolen or that the wrong tomb was visited (how?), but he knows that Jesus really died and that he really wasn’t alive afterward (how?). I’d be much more convinced by his argument if he had an explanation for why the tomb was empty. I think some of the other theories Licona covers are far superior to Vermes’, but perhaps you’ll conclude otherwise.
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