Michael Licona‘s fifth hypothesis to examine is that of Pieter Craffert. Licona summarizes Craffert’s hypothesis (CfH) this way:
- Craffert’s approach is postmodern in nature, accepting the validity of multiple realities. (my clarification: Craffert is not a radical postmodernist; he does believe that there is a real history that can be retrieved to a certain extent).
- Events have both “viewer-independent qualities” and “viewer-dependent qualities.” For example, a tree can be described in biological terms (i.e., viewer independent) or described as a shelter (i.e., viewer dependent). Historians must distinguish between these qualities.
- Historians must recognize that ancient people interpreted events differently from the way modern people do.
- Jesus’ disciples were in an altered state of consciousness (ASC) when they saw the “risen” Jesus, but such experiences were normal events for ancient people, who considered these experiences real. Therefore, when the disciples had a subjective vision (i.e., they didn’t see an external object), they judged it to be an objective vision of a physical, living Jesus, even though Jesus’ body was still in the grave.
- All of Jesus’ appearances occurred in a subjective sense (i.e., only in the minds of those who “saw” him), not in an “ontologically objective sense” (565).
For the sake of reference, here are the abbreviations Licona uses for the hypotheses under consideration:
CfH = Craffert’s hypothesis; CsH = Crossan’s hypothesis; LH = Lüdemann’s hypothesis; GH = Goulder’s hypothesis; VH = Vermes’ hypothesis
Using the five criteria for weighing historical hypotheses, Licona judges Craffert’s hypothesis as follows:
1. Explanatory scope. CfH explains Jesus’ death and the appearances to followers, but it does not account for Paul’s experience. Therefore, CfH fails this criterion and is inferior to GH, LH, and CsH in scope.
2. Explanatory power. CfH fails this criterion because it “proposes interpretations that clearly run contrary to the plain sense of the texts” (580).
3. Plausibility. CfH is implausible because it cannot account for Paul’s experience. It trails VH in this category.
4. Less ad hoc. Because psychohistory is “purely conjectural,” CfH possesses a strong ad hoc component (581-82). It is thus more ad hoc than VH.
5. Illumination. It passes this criterion because if it’s true, it would shed light on ancient religious experiences.
I’m not convinced by Craffert’s proposal. I concur with Licona’s assessment that, if one is skeptical of supernatural claims, it is better to propose that the stories are legendary and developed quickly, rather than to say that they were part of ASC experiences. More importantly, though, I remain unconvinced that Jesus’ disciples would have used resurrection when speaking of Jesus if they knew that his body remained dead somewhere. This seems to be part of CfH.
It seems to me that Craffert’s hypothesis simply doesn’t fit into Licona’s criteria for evaluating an historical hypothesis. I’ve read some of Craffert’s work online this morning and skimmed Licona’s own analysis. I think there’s considerable truth in Craffert’s approach, which I understand as this: (1) the meaning of the reports of Jesus sightings after Jesus’ crucifixion must be understood in the historical and cultural context of the world of those who made these reports, and (2) within this context, these reports can be understood as a true and real account of what the reporters experienced, but not necessarily as what others (either within or outside of this context) would have experienced had they been present for these events.
My reading of Craffert is that he neither confirms nor denies the historicity of the resurrection. I think he confirms that the resurrection was as real for the post-crucifixion witnesses of Jesus as any reality could ever be, but that this does not mean that the resurrection must also be real for you or me. I think Craffert is dead on when he states that what is and is not “real” is determined by the cultural system in which one might find oneself.
Craffert speaks to my own membership in a religious minority culture, in dialog with members of the majority religious culture. To an extent, acceptance of a relativistic world view allows this dialog to take place; otherwise we’d be bogged down in useless argument about right and wrong, true and false. But I think more can be said about this world view than it’s a compromise necessary to keep members of a pluralistic society from coming to blows.
My own tradition proclaims that “these, and these, are the words of the living God.”